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Contrasting Biological and Historical Approaches to The Evolution of 
Political Morality 
 
Ever since the publication of Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975, the idea 
that all of human behaviour — including ethics and politics — might ultimately be 
reducible to genetics has been gaining adherents1. Despite setbacks in the 1980's, when 
human sociobiology was roundly attacked as reactionary and simplistic, neo-Darwinian 
approaches to explaining human values and social practices have continued to multiply 
(most recently under labels such as ‘evolutionary psychology’ and ‘biopolitics’).  
 
Evolutionary biology has even begun to extend its reach into areas formerly reserved for 
the humanities such as literary theory and aesthetics. While much of this research remains 
novel and controversial, some of its results are undeniably sophisticated and interesting, 
especially when supported by recent advances in genetics and genomics which have 
opened a new window onto human evolution.2 Even where strong positive claims are not 
made for any kind of genetic determinism, proponents have begun to claim that neo-
Darwinism now threatens to supersede and even invalidate dominant traditions within 
value theory, such as liberalism and Christian humanism.3 
 
The reactions of moral and social philosophers have been mixed, some embracing the 
new trend towards the ‘naturalization’ of value, others categorically rejecting it as 
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reductionistic and ‘dehumanizing.’4 Counting in favour of the neo-Darwinian approach is 
the fact that an expanding range of clearly ethical human behaviours (e.g., incest 
avoidance, kin altruism) have been shown to closely parallel similar behaviours in non-
human species; moreover, convincing accounts of a genetic basis for some of those 
behaviours have now been developed which ought to apply equally across the entire 
biological continuum. And if those few ‘ethical’ behaviours have a genetic basis, then 
why not all of them? On the other hand, neo-Darwinian accounts have fared quite poorly 
when it comes to explaining cultural phenomena, and the cultural evolution that is such 
an important part of understanding human history and diversity. In fact, a major obstacle 
to human sociobiology is to explain why there is any such thing as ‘history’ at all. Other 
species are not historical as humans are: they do not regularly transform the conditions of 
their own existence, heritably, on a time-scale far too brief to be explained by genetic 
variation. Instead of explaining history, some neo-Darwinians have begun to try to 
explain it away: if they are correct, then any kind of historical ‘development’ is largely 
illusory, a mere epiphenomenon on the surface of deeper genetic continuities that are (in 
combination with the environment) the only true motors of change in human life. And if 
history is illusory, then so too must be the so-called ‘progress’ that is its outcome and the 
so-called ‘reason’ that is its cause.5 
 
What seems most desirable here for humanists — a theoretical middle-ground that can 
allow for and combine both cultural and genetic factors within moral and political 
philosophy — has few defenders because the two types of theory (humanistic and 
scientific) appear to exclude each other, methodologically if not logically. For instance, 
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the naturalistic fallacy would appear to preclude any attempt to derive robust normative 
conclusions from the results of natural selection. And while evolutionary psychologists 
are aware of this limitation and usually resist the temptation to make positive normative 
pronouncements, they are quite willing to declare that the evidence of a real and 
persistent biological human nature refutes the pie-in-the-sky hopes of utopian 
philosophers and social reformers alike. There seems, at first glance, little hope for 
combining such a creed with the humanistic scholarship that has been attempting for 
millennia now (with little reference to genetics) to describe history as humanity’s long 
striving towards the self-conscious mastery of its own existence. Both sides tend to see 
the debate as all-or-nothing: dominant trends in human social behaviour are either 
determined by genetic dispositions or they are not. If the pessimistic (and increasingly 
nihilistic) ethical conclusions of the neo-Darwinians are to be challenged, and normative 
value theory defended, then some way of combining them must be sought.  
 
In this brief paper I would like to use a single phenomenon — the opposition between 
political hierarchy and egalitarianism — to suggest the more general possibility of a 
theoretical middle-ground that can combine these rival approaches. I will propose that 
some well known themes within the tradition of humanistic scholarship on human nature 
can already accommodate a role for recent developments in human biology in a non-
nihilistic fashion. From Plato’s city-soul analogy through to Nietzsche’s master and slave 
moralities, and beyond that to the present day, humanistic theory has always recognized 
that society is complex and conflicted, as is every human psyche.6 Ants and bees may 
very well be genetically programmed to work and even to sacrifice themselves 
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altruistically on behalf of their kin, but they show no signs of having any qualms about 
doing so. Humans, by contrast, have qualms about all sorts of moral imperatives. And yet 
if the ultimate cause is the same in both cases, and was equally determinant of both 
species’ past survival, then why is it that humans are so conflicted? Why is it that we 
even recognize and set apart certain values and imperatives as ‘ethical’ at all, instead of 
simply acting them out unselfconsciously (as the ants appear to do)? This very conflict, I 
shall argue, can be taken as reflecting the competition between the factors of cultural and 
rational choice on the one hand, and genetic evolution on the other. The crux of my 
argument, however, comes from insights in comparative primatology and cultural 
anthropology. In short: the source of human complexity is prehistoric, but traditional 
humanistic theory has overlooked this because of its bias in favour of historical evidence 
as the guide to understanding human sociality. The implications for political theory may 
be quite significant and I will touch on them at the end.  
 
Consider the opposition: history versus pre-history. The main distinction between the two 
is the presence of writing, with historians confining themselves largely to those inquiries 
about the past that can be guided by documentary evidence — words written down and 
left behind by the people being investigated. Because of the durable persistence of written 
documents, humans over the past few millennia have gained intimate access to a wide 
range of tiny selections from a human past that was often very different from their own 
lived present. To this historical consciousness has been added an ever-increasing 
awareness of simultaneous human diversity gained through travel first facilitated by 
trade. The ‘first historian,’ the ancient Greek Herodotus, famously combined the 
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functions of both a historical researcher and an anthropological observer in his seminal 
investigation of the causes of the wars between the Persians and the Greeks.7 Ever since 
then, historians have been speculating about the causes of historical change more 
generally and poring over every surviving scrap of written human experience to do so.  
 
By contrast, prehistory has largely been a blank page until very recently and so has 
contributed very little to the dominant theoretical attempts to understand human nature. 
Its function has rather been to serve as a foil to the dynamic, creative concept of historical 
time: prehistory was defined negatively as the time before human beings did anything 
important. Since historians are themselves literate persons and have always lived within 
the political hierarchies and advanced economies of urban societies, prehistoric (non-
literate) peoples have suffered by comparison and have universally been adjudged 
‘primitive’ — i.e., to be remnants of a now-surpassed, and inferior, past age.8 Western 
historians have perhaps been peculiar in their tendency to tie this bias to an emancipatory 
view of reason, whereby societies that embody reason move more steadily towards 
prosperity, security, justice and human fulfilment. In all likelihood this Western concept 
of reason is inherently historical and hence dynamic and utopian, and a simple diagram 
can serve to capture much of the spirit of Western historical rationalism (see Diagram 
One). Conceptually, ‘history’ has understood itself to be a transitional period with a 
specific beginning and, in some cases, an anticipated end-state of human social 
improvement or perfection. Central to this notion is that literate societies participate in a 
kind of continuous change and conscious evolution which non-literate societies do not, 
because literate societies possess the historical self-awareness (made possible by writing) 
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by which to comprehend intentional social change as manifest in governmental 
institutions. Written law concretizes a people’s will to overcome its past and create a 
better social future. The most complete expression of this Western historical rationalism 
is found in Hegel, for whom writing, history, and the state all implicate each other 
mutually. As a political theorist, Hegel has virtually no use for prehistory.9 
 
Politically speaking, this familiar, progressive view of history tells the story of the shift 
from universal despotism towards universal freedom. Although it forms part of the 
dominant discourse of the European Enlightenment, it is not strictly a modern view. It has 
appeared wherever any kind of political individualism has achieved ascendency over 
authoritarianism, as was the case in the ancient Greek context of the first Western 
historians. For instance, we can read this progressivist historical rationalism in the 
famous fragment by the pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes (~550 bce) which stands to 
this day as a motto for Western humanism: “By no means did the gods reveal all things to 
mortals in the beginning; but in time, by seeking, we discover the better.” Xenophanes 
and the other pre-Socratic ‘philosophers’ formed an ambitious counter-cultural movement 
in ancient Greece that was extremely self-conscious about its own historical role: no less 
than to carry humanity across the threshold from passive prehistory into active, 
investigative reason — and thereby to begin the long, difficult march of history towards a 
better future. In this fragment, Xenophanes expresses his faith that human beings can, 
through their own intergenerational efforts, discover new insights by which to improve 
their condition. Not long ago — in a continuing line of direct descent from Xenophanes 
— Francis Fukuyama published his The End of History And The Last Man, a triumphalist 
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reading of the collapse of Soviet communism as a demonstration that history had indeed 
achieved its culmination in Western liberal democracy.10 This brings us to our case in 
point: contrasting theoretical accounts of the evolution of political morality from 
despotism to democracy.  
 
At best, the empirical historical case that has been made for the popular Western belief in 
the inevitability of democracy and egalitarian values is not overly persuasive (formal 
democracies ancient and modern have collectively governed the lives of only a tiny 
fraction of the people who have lived during historical times); and world events since 
1989 have already prompted many, including Fukuyama himself, to draw back from his 
overly optimistic conclusions. Technological progress is clear, but progress towards 
universal freedom has been spotty and has yet even once to reach a majority of the global 
population; moreover, the modern technology that is the most visible sign of historical 
progress has itself repeatedly threatened to wipe out the whole human race through ethnic 
and ideological conflict, or environmental destruction. Into this crack of self-doubt have 
sprung the neo-Darwinists, eager to point out the limitations of a mostly-speculative 
humanism that has ignored human biology and based itself on the ridiculously small 
sample of evidence of progress that is provided by ‘history.’ Proponents of ‘biopolitics’ 
point instead to the deep prehistory of humanity which stretches almost 200,000 years 
into the past and blends continuously into the genetic evolution of other species including 
the other primates and now-extinct hominids.11 What was human life like during that long 
prehistory? There are no written records to tell us and only scant archaeological evidence 
to go by, insufficient to reconstruct social structure or behaviour in any detail. But as the 
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neo-Darwinists claim, a great deal of evidence does still exist: not only genetics, but 
comparative primatology and the record of physical anthropology. This evidence points 
to a very different account of human nature than what we typically find in humanistic 
theorists like Hegel. 
 
Apes are hierarchical animals whose social behaviour is governed by relations of 
dominance and submission, though to a degree that varies by species. They are territorial 
animals who compete violently with other groups of their own species for resources. 
Those most closely related to humans, the Chimpanzees, are the most despotic of all: 
every adult male enjoys a status higher than all females, and both males and females 
compete violently with others of the same sex for positions within a linear hierarchy. 
Those at the top of the hierarchy enjoy considerable advantages in access to food and 
mates; their genes are disproportionately reproduced in all subsequent generations, and to 
a degree that corresponds to their rank; they continuously dominate, control, hector, 
intimidate, ostracize and sometimes even kill those who challenge them for status and 
those who submit to them alike. A wide range of bodily characteristics (e.g., size and 
shape of teeth, thickness of skull, sexual dimorphism) are identifiable as the physical 
correlates of these social relations, and these features may be read in the fossil remains of 
early humans and others just as they are in the kinetics of living apes. Without a doubt, 
primate nature has been honed through millions of years of intense natural selection for 
success in intra-specific dominance, aggression, and intimidation.12 
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To judge by our physical traits alone, humans ought to fit neatly into this pattern of 
despotic social organization, likely somewhere in the mid-range of existing primates (see 
Diagram Two, vertical axis). And while human social organization in deep prehistory 
eludes us, there is certainly no shortage of evidence for despotic violence from recent 
human history, let alone the daily news. Most of that evidence appears to confirm these 
neo-Darwinian insights. To many of the proponents of neo-Darwinian social theory, this 
reveals the true reality of our nature and our inheritance: deep down we are violent, 
aggressive and largely selfish apes who desire above all to dominate others but who also 
submit to domination by others who intimidate us.  
 
How then are democracy and egalitarianism even possible? According to Somit and 
Peterson, these more ‘peaceful’ sentiments are products of what they call 
‘indoctrinability,’ a human tendency which derivies from evolved religious behaviours 
whereby communities collectively cultivate strange, mythological belief systems as a 
means of maintaining group cohesion and identity.13 The argument is that religious belief 
systems are like artistic representations of an invisible world which cannot be challenged 
or refuted by experience. While the value of religious behaviour overall has been 
adaptive, it has as a byproduct beliefs that can culturally evolve in opposition to other of 
our genetic dispositions. The cultivation of non-natural value-beliefs such as 
egalitarianism is therefore an evolutionary ‘mistake’ because those beliefs will constantly 
be contradicted by actual human behaviour; but the fact that human minds have evolved 
to be ‘indoctrinable’ means that we go on brainwashing ourselves culturally to believe in 
them anyway. The upshot is that while we might deceive ourselves about our motives and 
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our intentions, our evolved disposition to behave in more normal primate fashion will still 
usually trump our dogmas. Political and moral philosophy are reduced to varieties of self-
deceptive mind games — and the belief in human progress a pure fantasy.  
 
Let me turn now to my proposal for bringing these competing accounts together. As I 
already said, humanistic political philosophers have always recognized fairly profound 
divisions within the human person, so much so that a person’s mind can often even be 
said to be ‘at war with itself.’ In Plato, as for most of the Western tradition, this is viewed 
as a struggle between reason and passion, or soul and body. In Nietzsche, this becomes a 
struggle between noble and slavish values; while Nietzsche downplays the role of reason, 
still his conflict is between a ‘higher’ (i.e., spiritual) purpose and ‘lower’ (i.e., bodily) 
comforts and conveniences. Both of these classic authors, and many others besides, 
project these psychic conflicts out onto society as a whole, such that they become social 
oppositions (with opposing classes of people dominated by opposing values).  Moreover, 
Nietzsche speaks of the origin of ethics proper as the culmination of a violent moulding 
of a people by a ruling elite, such that in order to survive people must first learn to 
suppress their ‘natural’ (i.e. prehistoric) instincts beneath those required by imposed (i.e., 
historical) law. Only by means of such self-mastery does nature succeed in “breeding an 
animal with the right to make promises.”14 
 
The key to seeing how these classical treatments (and others like them) have anticipated 
recent discoveries in human biology is provided by evidence from cultural anthropology. 
Just as neo-Darwinian biologists look to genetic and behavioural parallels between 
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species in order to construct theories of human political behaviour during prehistory, 
anthropologists look to the behaviours of surviving prehistoric peoples, and extrapolate 
backwards through time. In fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of observed 
prehistoric cultures is the elaborate effort that almost all of them put into maintaining an 
egalitarian ethos — in direct contradiction to what their biology alone would supposedly 
predict. Christopher Boehm notes how this ethos is virtually universal in existing 
prehistoric communities and in all likelihood was universal throughout human prehistory, 
at least since the advent of complex language. He indicates how even chimpanzees 
exhibit tendencies towards solitary events of egalitarian action where groups of 
submissive apes collectively stand up to dominant individuals, effectively turning the 
hierarchy upside down, momentarily. Chimpanzees however, do not possess the means to 
extend these events beyond the moment.  
 
Early humans, by contrast, possessed several features that pre-adapted them to the 
establishment of what Boehm calls ‘reverse dominance hierarchies,’ in which low-status 
individuals collectively assume political control over high-status individuals — most 
notably the invention of lethal weapons that can kill from a distance (allowing low-status 
individuals to easily dispose of dominant males). Both humans and chimpanzees 
demonstrate not only the desire to dominate others, and the willingness to submit, but an 
additional emotional response: resentment of submission. This resentment means that 
their submission is never total and dependable, and that leaders must always expect coups 
from below. The final element that humans needed to develop and maintain reverse 
dominance hierarchies, however, was language. Language both empowered low-status 
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individuals to build coalitions against their more intimidating dominators, and allowed 
them to record through narrative the dominance-seeking actions of high-status 
individuals. The upshot of Boehm’s case is that humans are indeed genetically 
predisposed to selfish, violent, dominant and intimidating behaviour, but that low status 
individuals have found ways to act upon their resentment of submission through 
coordinated collective action. Through the medium of complex language, humans 
overcome their submissive emotion of fear by standing and working together with their 
low-status peers to resist oppression by intimidating individuals. This was a major 
cultural elaboration of a pre-existing minor genetic tendency. 
 
The implications of these insights for political and moral theory are quite striking. 
Following Boehm’s argument, I have proposed a chronological trajectory of human 
political evolution in Diagram Two. It begins, at the left, with humans fitting like 
chimpanzees into the normal range of primate social despotism. Then, as language 
appears on the scene about 50,000 years ago (y.a.), low-status individuals seize the 
opportunity this provides to organize against their intimidating leaders, largely through 
the cultural maintenance of a ‘reverse dominance hierarchy’ by means of an egalitarian 
ethos. Finally, about the time that humans begin to settle down and take up agriculture 
(~10,000 y.a.), the dominance hierarchies are reversed once again, with alpha males 
seizing power and instituting social classes leading to the first cities (~6,000 y.a.).   
 
This theory affirms Nietzsche’s suggestion that the complexity of human agency is the 
product of a culturally-maintained opposition to each person’s own inherited, instinctive, 
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genetic dispositions. This is not, however, what Somit & Peterson call an erroneous 
translation of religious ‘doctrine’ into politics, but rather has been a rational, creative, and 
highly successful strategy to overcome our own biological nature through coordinated 
action. The coordination is provided by a culturally maintained egalitarian ethos. For at 
least 50,000 years humans lived in small-scale, territorial societies that maintained 
egalitarian political structures in the face of continual attempts by powerful individuals to 
dominate the group from within. Perhaps the most striking feature of this proposal, 
however, is the implication that this successful strategy was undermined completely with 
the appearance of settled agricultural communities at the end of the last ice-age (10,000 
y.a.). Somehow, likely by means of the private accumulation of capital made possible by 
settlement, dominant individuals learned how to beat the reverse dominance hierarchy 
system and return human society to the more standard, linear dominance hierarchies that 
have been almost universal throughout the brief, recent period of human experience 
known as ‘history.’ Ironically, this most recent reversal of fortune has been so complete 
that humans in the historical period have become by far the most despotic of all of the 
apes: the collapse of the social effectiveness of the culturally-maintained prehistoric 
egalitarian ethos has restored genetically-based dominance hierarchies with a vengeance.  
 
Which, then, may we deem to be the more ‘natural’ option for humans: hierarchy or 
equality? Political philosophers have been misled somewhat by their concentration on 
historical evidence, because history does not reflect the fact that despotism was a 
relatively new thing in the first cities, and that the persistence of social dominance by 
elite groups throughout history to this day has been maintained by much deeper and 
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genetic primate means: the leaders’ ability to achieve mass submission through public 
demonstrations of violence and intimidation. Philosophers who understand the evolution 
of political morality to be the inevitable march of reason from prehistoric despotism to 
ultra-civilized freedom would appear to have their story backwards.   
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Diagram One: Western Historical Rationalism 
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Diagram Two: Long-Term Human Political Evolution (after C. Boehm, 1999) 
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